Communities that own waste-to-energy (WTE) facilities rely heavily on the revenues generated by their facility to help pay for the costs to finance, operate and maintain these facilities.
The two primary revenue streams are tipping fees and energy sales, generally in the form of electricity. While communities often retain all of the tipping fee revenue, revenue from the sale of energy is nearly always shared with the contract operator. In some cases the shared energy revenues include both capacity and electricity payments. The basis of this strategy is to offer the contract operator an added incentive to maximize this revenue stream through more efficient operation and, in the case of capacity payments, to meet certain capacity commitment criteria required by the energy purchaser. This strategy recognizes that the contract operator has some degree of control over the factors that affect energy production.
Under most existing service agreements, which date back to the 1980s, energy revenues are shared on a 9011 0 basis, with 90 percent going to the community. Now that many of these service agreements are coming up for renewal or are expiring, communities will need to revisit how best to share energy revenues with the contract operator in order to maximize the total revenues 47 retained by the community. This paper analyzes several different approaches to sharing energy revenues in light of the operational experience gained over the past 20 plus years and concludes that, while energy revenue sharing is still in the best interest of the community, the widely employed strategy of a 9011 0 split may not offer the best incentive, and therefore may not lead to the maximization of energy revenues to the community.
INTRODUCTION
As of 2004, there were 89 WTE facilities operating in the United States [1] . Most of these projects were developed in the 1980s and early 1990s and are approaching 20 years of operation. More than one-third of the WTE facilities are publicly owned, with the vast majority of these plants being operated and maintained by private firms under 20 or 25 five year service agreements. The contract operator's compensation typically consists of either an annual service fee or a processing fee for each ton of waste processed and, in many cases, a share of revenues from the sale of energy and metals recovered from the waste and/or ash streams. renewal or will be expiring within the next 5 years, which will require these communities to negotiate new service agreements either with the current operator on a sole-source basis or as part of a request for proposal process. This presents an opportunity for the community to review the terms and conditions of the original service agreement in light of the operational experience gained over the first term including the merits of sharing a portion of the energy revenues with the contract operator. Energy revenues have historically been a significant source of additional revenue to the contract operator, representing as much as 10-15 percent of their total revenues.
PAST ENERGY REVENUE SHARING PRACTICES
Energy sales are also a significant source of revenue to the community and are critical to achieving a competitive tipping fee. Total energy revenues can be equivalent to $20-$40 per ton of waste depending on the energy contract price. Therefore, maximizing energy production should be one of the community's primary operational goals. There are a number of ways to maximize energy revenues including:
generating more electricity by increasing facility throughput through higher steam capacity utilization and/or higher boiler availability;
(ii) generating more electricity by optimizing the efficiency of the power cycle; and/or (iii) selling a higher percentage of the gross electricity produced by reducing in-plant power consumption.
Since the contract operator has a large degree of control over all of the above factors, consideration is often given to sharing a portion of the net energy revenues with the contract operator as a fmancial incentive to maximize these revenues. In fact, most of the original WTE service agreements provided for sharing a portion of the net electricity revenues with the contract operator. In the vast majority of these deals, the municipality receives 90 percent of the total net electricity revenues and the contract operator 10 percent. In a few cases, the Copyright © 2006 by ASME 48 municipality receives 100 percent of the net electricity revenues up to an armual guarantee with the contract operator receiving significantly more than 10 percent of the revenues from electricity generated in excess of an annual guarantee.
OPERATING EXPERIENCE WITH 10 PERCENT ENERGY REVENUE SHARE
A 10 percent energy revenue share has, for the most part, been adopted as the generally accepted industry standard over the years. 
ENERGY REVENUE SHARING OPTIONS
There are several potential energy revenue sharing options that are available to a community that will need to enter into a new service agreement in the future including the traditional 90/10 split. The following four options represent a range of different approaches, each with its own merits. A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of each option is provided in Table 1 .
Under this option, 100 percent of the energy revenues would be retained by the community.
Option 2 -Percentage Share of Total Net
Energy Revenues
Under this option, the community would share a fixed percentage (e.g., 10 percent) of the total net energy revenues with the contract operator.
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Option 3 -Percentage Share of Excess Net
Energy Revenues
Under this option, the community would share a fixed percentage (e.g., 50 percent) of the net energy revenues from electricity generated in excess of an annual amount stated in the service agreement.
Option 4 -Energy Credit Based on an Efficiency
Factor
Under this option, the community would pay an energy credit to the contract operator for operating in excess of a base efficiency factor (e.g., KWH/ton waste processed, KWHIKlbs steam).
CONCLUSION
In order to maximize energy revenues, it would be in a community's best interest to share energy revenues with the contract operator. However, based on operating experience over the past 20 years, the widely employed strategy of a 90/1 0 split may not offer the best incentive.
While payment of an energy credit based on an efficiency factor would tie energy revenue sharing directly to the efficiency of the power cycle, efficiency factors can be affected by conditions outside the control of the contract operator and therefore would not be as fair an approach.
Sharing energy revenues based on excess net revenues (Option 3) would appear to be the best approach because it offers the greatest incentive to the contract operator to maximize energy 
